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Probate of a Part of a Will
By T O As E. ATKINSON*
At the outset it should be noticed that some objections to a
will are determined on probate while others are litigated at dis-
tribution or in the course of other proceedings, including those
brought for construction of the instrument. The matters of execu-
tion, testamentary capacity, undue influence, fraud, mistake and
revocation are adjudged on probate or general contest and norm-
ally cannot be raised in any other manner.' This paper is confined
to situations where these objections go to a part but not all of the
will, although it also includes those wherein there is failure of
proof as to some of the contents of the will. Problems of partial
internal validity, or of partial failure of the will due to election of
the spouse or pretermitted children, or to excessive charitable
devises are beyond the scope of the discussion since these matters
do not arise upon probate. There may be interesting parallels
between these two general categories but the latter must abide
some later study.
The disparity in the holdings, or at least in the expressed at-
titude, of the courts as to partial probate may be seen by a com-
parison of two decisions selected more or less at random. In
Matter of Kent's Will2 the instrument presented for probate in
New York had been mutilated; paragraph 6, apparently making
one or more legacies, had been cut out, as had also a part of
paragraph 10, the remainder of which disposed of half of the
residue. It was fairly clear that the excisions had been made by
the testatrix with the intent to revoke only the missing portions of
the will, but since New York did not permit partial revocation
by mutilation there was, as such, no revocation. The estate of
$30,000 was sufficient to pay all the general legacies and leave
* A.B., University of North Dakota; LL.B., University of Michigan; J.S.D.,
Yale University; Professor of Law, New York University. Author, Atkinson on
Wills; co-editor, Mechem & Atkinson Cases on Wills and Administration and
Atkinson-Chadbourne Cases on Civil Procedure; American Law of Property (with
others).
'AxmcAN LAW or PRoPERTY sees. 14.35, 1437 (1952).
2 169 App. Dis. 388, 155 N.Y. Supp. 894 (1915), reversing, 89 Misc. 16, 152
N.Y. Supp. 557 (1915).
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over half for the residue. The Surrogate found that paragraph 6
had contained legacies of $2,500 to two persons, each of whom
was also named as a beneficiary of one fourth of the residue in
the missing part of paragraph 10, and accordingly probated the
will including the missing parts. However, the Appellate Division
regarded the proof of the missing parts as insufficient and directed
that if proper proof was not supplied the will minus the omis-
sions should be probated, with the result that whatever was
originally included in paragraph 6 would go into the residue and
the testatrix would be deemed to have died intestate as to half
of her residuary estate. The upper court declared that it was
permissible to probate a part of a will, "unless it can be seen that
the missing parts would affect or alter the remaining parts."
Thus, while purporting to follow its rule forbidding partial re-
vocation by physical act, the decision in effect permits it when
the missing portions cannot be shown.
A recent Kansas case 3 reaches a different conclusion upon
similar facts. There the will was contested by collateral heirs.
The first four clauses were not dispositive and the fifth clause
devised certain real property to one charity while the seventh
clause left the residue of the estate to another charity. The sixth
clause had been obliterated so that it could not be read. The
opinion notes that it could not be assumed that the sixth clause
did not affect the property passing under the residuary clause,
and declared that if proof of the contents of the sixth clause could
not be made the instrument should be rejected in toto since it
was not the will executed by the testator.-
With these contrasting viewpoints in mind, it is proposed to
examine the cases in each of the five principal situations wherein
the problem of partial probate may arise, and then hazard a con-
clusion.
Manner of Execution of Will
Cases may fall in this category for several different reasons.
Sometimes a will has been validly executed so far as dispositions
of personal property were concerned, but not in the manner re-
In re Johannes Estate, 170 Kan. 407, 227 P. 2d 148, 24 A.L.R. 2d 507
(1951).
Proof of contents of the missing portions was later made with the assistance
of a laboratory technician and handwriting experts. In re Johannes' Estate, 178
Kan. 298, 245 P. 2d 979 (1952).
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quired to pass land. Of course this was true under the English
Statute of Wills, 1540, and the Statute of Frauds, 1677. Formerly
in some American jurisdictions a larger number of witnesses were
necessary for devises than for bequests, or no attestors at all were
required for the latter. Even today nuncupative or informal mili-
tary wills usually may dispose only of chattel interests. In all of
these situations the question might arise as to whether a will
purporting to pass both species of property is bad altogether, or
whether it may be probated for the limited purpose of disposition
of the personalty.5 A somewhat similar problem is presented
where an informal will attempts to pass property of greater value
than is permitted under the statute for that type of disposition.
Some decisions in the execution cases reject the will alto-
gether," although most have upheld the will as to the permissible
part.7 However, the matter is not as simple as this count would
indicate. Two of the decisions8 which deny probate of the entire
will notice the point that to establish the will in part only would,
in the circumstances of the case in hand, thwart the testator's
purposes rather than cany his intent partially into effect. The
opinion on Starr v. Starr 9 illustrates the injustice of a result which
upholds a bequest of testator's chattels to his daughter but in-
validates a devise of all lands to his son. However, in other cases
5 Until the English Court of Probate Act, 1857, 20 & 21 Vict., c. 77, sec. 62,
the ecclesiastical court probate had no effect upon devises of land contained in the
instrument; the latter had to be established in each proceeding at law or in equity
wherein the title to land was in controversy. See Montgomery v. Clark, 2 Atk.
378, 26 Eng. Rep. 629 (1742); Starr v. Starr, 2 Root 303 (Conn. 1795). In
Pennsylvania, where only charitable bequests require attestation, the entire will
is probated and the validity of charitable bequests is determined on distribution.
Carson's Estate, 241 Pa. 117, 88 Ad. 311 (1913); see Slater v. Moyer, 245 Pa. 60,
91 Ad. 216 (1914) (devises of land).
'Starr v. Starr, 2 Root 303 (Conn. 1795); Stricker v. Oldenburgh, 39 Iowa
653 (1874); see also In re Beck's Will, 142 N.J. Eq. 15, 18, 58 A. 2d 869, 871
(1948); Godman v. Godman [1920] P. 261, 287 (C.A.); Erwin v. Hamner, 27
Ala. 296 (1855); In re Beck's Will, 142 N.J. Eq. 15, 58 A. 2d 869 (1948).
'Brown v. United States, 65 F. 2d 65 (9th Cir. 1933); Lake v. Warner, 34
Conn. 483 (1868); In re Block's Estate, 196 So. 410 (Fla. 1940); Brown v.
Avery, 63 Fla. 355, 376, 58 So. 34 (1912); Hays v. Ernest, 32 Fla. 18, 13 So. 451
(1893); Mulligan v. Leonard, 46 Iowa 692 (1877); Gutbrie v. Owen, 2 Hump.
202 (Tenn. 1840); In re Davis' Will, 103 Wis. 455, 79 N.W. 761 (1899); Offutt
v. Offutt, 3 B. Mon. (42 Ky.) 162, 163 (1842); Marston v. Marston, 17 N.H. 503
(1845); see Hubbard v. Hubbard, 8 N.Y. 196 (1853); Street's Heirs v. Street, 11
Leigh 498 (Va. 1841); Swarn v. Weed, 274 Mass. 125, 130, 174 N.E. 314, 315
(1931).3Godman v. Godman, and Starr v. Starr, supra note 6. Cf. Ragland v.
Wagener, 142 Tex. 651, 180 S.W. 2d 435, 152 A.L.R. 1232 (1944).
'See note 6 supra.
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rejecting the entire will there would have been no injustice in
partial probate and doubtless the testator would have preferred
this to total failure of his dispositions. 10
Most of the cases where the will is probated in part involve
only a single beneficiary, or the property is given to several per-
sons in equal shares. 1 Surely the testator would have desired
pro tanto establishment in this situation, although most of the
opinions make no mention of this point. 2
Testamentary Capacity
In an old Massachusetts case' a married woman's will exer-
cised a power of appointment in the authorized manner, but her
attempt to bequeath her chattels was ineffective because of cover-
ture. The court decreed probate limited to the exercise of the
power. This result was reasonable since the same person was
the beneficiary as to both dispositions. Of course this particular
problem cannot occur today, since the last vestiges of testa-
mentary incapacity of married women have been swept away.
Formerly one could bequeath chattels at a younger age than
was permissible for a devise of land, and this is still true in a few
states. The cases are uniform in allowing the bequests when the
testator met the age requirement as to disposition of personalty
although the will purportedly contained devises of land which
could not be upheld because of minority. 4 In none of the cases
did it appear that the land and the chattels were given to dif-
ferent persons. 15
It was once held in England that the testator's insane delusion
was fatal to his will although it did not affect his disposition,16
"aStricker v. Oldenburgh, supra note 6 (only one beneficiary); quaere as to
Erwin v. Hamner, supra note 6.
'Perhaps this can be said of all of the cases supra note 7, except Brown v.
Avery.
" But see Guthrie v. Owen, supra note 7. In Luke v. Warner, supra note 7,
the provisions of the will are not stated in the opinion, which indicates the rule of
Starr v. Starr, supra note 6, has been superseded in Connecticut.
'Heath v. Withington, 6 Cush. (60 Mass.) 497 (1850); see also Reed v.
Blaisdell, 16 N.H. 194 (1844).
"4 Deane v. Littlefield, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 239 (1822); Early v. Arnold, 119 Va.
500, 89 S.E. 900 (1916); see also Banks v. Sherrod, 52 Ala. 267 (1875) (charge
of legacies on land).
Cf. Banks v. Sherrod, supra note 14. In Deave v. Littlefield, supra note 14,
the court noticed that there was a single beneficiary so that no inequality re-
salted.
a Waring v. Waring, 6 Moore P.C. 341, 18 Eng. Rep. 715 (1848).
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but this view has been abandoned there.1'7 In the United States
it is generally agreed that if the testator's mind meets the general
test for testamentary capacity, his will is not invalid because he
possessed some insane delusion which did not affect the will.'
The cases are rare which consider the problem of an insane delu-
sion affecting part but not all of the will. An English decision
denied probate of the part of the will prompted by the insane
delusion, 9 and dicta in American cases recognize this possibility.20
Of course baffling questions might arise as to just how far an in-
sane delusion affected the provisions of the will; and it is pos-
sible, though not probable, that in particular cases it might be
unfair to probate only the portions of the will not affected by the
delusion.
Undue Influence, Fraud and Mistake
At the start there is a special problem in the undue influence
and fraud cases. Should the misconduct of third persons invali-
date devises to innocent beneficiaries although it did cause the
gifts to the latter? Although the matter is none too clear, it seems
that undue influence may invalidate provisions for the innocent.
21
On the other hand, the fraud cases seem to show an inclination to
uphold bequests to the innocent if they can be sustained on any
rational causal basis other than the fraud of third persons. 21 Per-
haps the courts are applying broader causal principles in penaliz-
ing those who are guilty than they do in case of those who are
"Banks v. Goodfellow, L.R. 5 Q.B. 549 (1870).
'" Pendarvis v. Gibb, 328 Ill. 282, 159 N.E. 353 (1927), 23 ILL. L. REv. 299;
In re Eveleth's Will, 177 Iowa 716, 157 N.W. 257 (1916); In re Morley's Estate,
138 Ore. 75, 5 P. 2d 92 (1931).
"In re Estate of Bohrmann [1988], 1 All E.R. 271, 16 Can. B.R. 405, 24
Iowa L.R. 630; see also Haddock v. Trotman, 1 Fost. & F. 31, 175 Eng. Rep. 612
(1857).
'Estate of Hart, 107 Cal. App. 2d 60, 236 P. 2d 884 (1951); Holmes v.
Campbell College, 87 Kan. 597, 125 Pac. 25, 41 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1126 (1912);
Hegarty's Appeal, 75 Pa. 503, 514 (1874). Cf. Randolph v. Laxpkin, 90 Ky. 551,
14 S.W. 538, 10 L.R.A. 87 (1890) where the court speaks of "want of sufficient
testamentary capacity" and is obviously thinking of the sort of mental defect that
affects the whole will; and see Hildreth v. Hildreth, 153 Ky. 597, 156 S.W. 144
(1913).
' Vanvalkenberg v. Vanvalkenberg, 90 Ind. 433 (1883); In re Hanson's
Estate, 169 Wash. 637, 14 P. 2d 702 (1932); cf. Stutiville's Ex'rs v. Wheeler, 187
Ky. 361, 219 S.W. 411 (1920), where the influence was found not to be undue.
See also note 26 infra,
--See Wilkinson v. Joughin, L.R. 2 Eq. 319 (1866); Provenza v. Provenza,
201 Miss. 836, 29 So. 2d 669 (1947); Howell v. Troutman, 53 N.C. (8 Jones)
276 (1860). See infra notes 28-30.
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not.23 Although this point of view is not as discernable in the
undue influence cases, it may be that there too an unconscious
distinction is drawn.
The remainder of this section assumes situations wherein
some of the gifts are considered to be due to misconduct or mis-
take, and others are not. Numerous opinions indicate that the
parts of the will unaffected by undue influence may be upheld
although the tainted part is rejected. 4 Some of these decisions
qualify the rule with the proposition that the gifts must be
separable,2' and in at least one case they were considered to be
inseparable with the result that the entire will is invalid if undue
influence is shown.26 Moreover, in Illinois and Missouri it is held
that upon trial of the statutory issue of "will or no will" the entire
instrument must be denied probate, apparently regardless of
whether the provisions are separable.
An English case rejected a bequest to a woman who fraudu-
lently misrepresented herself to be a widow and hence free to
marry the testator, but upheld a legacy to her child by her lawful
husband who was still living.28 The American cases hold that the
unaffected part of the will may be probated although the de-
frauder is denied the fruits of his schemes.2 9 One case mentions
'See Wilkinson v. Joughin, supra note 22.
'Zeigler v. Coffin, 219 Ala. 586, 123 So. 22, 63 A.L.R. 942 (1929); Hyatt v.
Wroten, 184 Ark. 847, 43 S.W. 2d 726 (1931); Snodgrass v. Smith, 42 Colo. 60,
94 Pac. 312, 15 Ann. Cas. 548 (1908); Pepin v. Ryan, 133 Conn. 12, 47 A. 2d
846 (1946); In re Ankeny's Estate, 238 Iowa 754, 28 N.W. 2d 414 (1947); vell-
man v. Carter, 286 Mass. 237, 190 N.E. 493 (1934); In re George's Estate, 144
Neb. 887, 15 N.W. 2d 80 (1944); Matter of Maguire, 105 Misc. 433, 173 N.Y.
Supp. 392 (1918); In re Koller's Estate, 116 Neb. 764, 219 N.W. 4 (1928);
Sumner v. Staton, 151 N.C. 198, 65 S.E. 902 (1909); Carothers' Estate, 300 Pa.
185, 150 AtI. 585 (69 A.L.R. 1127 (1930) ). See also Shelton v. Gordon, 252
Ala. 187, 40 So. 2d 95 (1949).
Hyatt v. Wroten, Ankeny's Estate, Wellman v. Carter, Matter of Maguire,
Carothers' Estate, all supra note 24. See also Walker v. Irby, 238 S.W. 844 (Tex.
Com. App. 1922).
In re George's Estate, supra note 24. See also In re Kelly's Estate, 150 Ore.
598, 46 P. 2d 84 (1935); In re Dand's Estate, 41 Wash. 2d 158, 247 P. 2d 1016
(1952); supra note 21.
'Snyder v. Steele, 304 Ill. 387, 136 N.E. 649, 28 A.L.R. 1 (1922), 32 YALE
L. J. 294; McCarthy v. Fidelity Nat. Bank & T. Co., 325 Mo. 727, 30 S.W. 2d 19,
69 A.L.R. 1122 (1930), 16 IowA L. Bxv. 119 (1930); see In re Dand's Estate,
supra note 26.
' Wilkinson v. Joughin, supra note 22. The court considered that the gift to
the child might have been prompted by affection, regardless of the fact that
testator was not legally married to the mother. Cf. In re Rosenberg's Estate, 196
Ore. 219, 246 P. 2d 858 (1952).
' In re Carson's Estate, 184 Cal. 437, 194 Pac. 5, 17 A.L.R. 239 (1920); In
re Hollis' Estate, 234 Iowa 761, 12 N.W. 2d 576 (1944); O'Connell v. Dowd, 182
Mass. 541, 66 N.E. 788 (1903); Black v. Smith, 58 N.D. 109, 224 N.W. 915
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the necessity of separability in order to probate part of the will.3"
Mistake in the inducement, in the absence of fraud, is not
ground for attacking a will unless it appears on the face of the
instrument what the testator would have desired but for the
mistake.31 It is extremely unlikely that a case involving the pos-
sibility of partial probate will arise on account of a mistake of this
nature.
It is commonly held that an entire will cannot be contested
for a mistaken description or scrivener's error,32 although the mat-
ter can sometimes be put aright in the process of construction.33
One American decision had adjudged partial probate on the
ground of mistake in the preparation of the will.3 4 In that case
the testator devised his realty to one person and his personalty
to another; but it was shown that he considered certain lease-
hold premises to be real property. After a great deal of difficulty
it was held that the bequest of personalty was not the will of the
testator as to the leasehold, and hence the latter was excepted
from the probate. There is no reason why an entire devise or
bequest cannot be denied probate upon proof that it was inserted
by mistake.35 Indeed English practice goes way beyond this and
freely permits restrictive words inserted by mistake to be stricken
on probate although this has the effect of increasing the gift.30
(1929). See also In re Holmes' Estate, 98 Colo. 360, 56 P. 2d 1333 (1936);
Matter of Maguire and In re Koller's Estate, both supra note 18, Ogden v. Green-
leaf, 143 Mass. 349, 9 N.E. 745 (1887); In re Dand's Estate, supra note 26, 41
Wash. 2d 158, 247 P. 2d 1016 (1952). As to the distinction between fraud and
undue influence, see In re Estate of Newhall, 190 Cal. 709, 214 Pac. 231, 28
A.L.R. 778 (1923).
'In re Carson's Estate, supra note 22.
'Martindale v. Bridgforth, 210 Ala. 565, 98 So. 800 (1924); Matter of
Tousey, 34 Misc. 363, 69 N.Y. Supp 846 (1901); Gifford v. Dyer, 2 R.I. 99 (1852).
" Campbell v. Campbell, 138 Ill. 612, 28 N.E. 1080 (1891); Ex parte King,
132 S.C. 63, 128 S.E. 850 (1925). But see In re Kempthorne's Estate, 188 Iowa
70, 175 N.W. 857 (1920).
Campbell v. Campbell and Ex parte King, both supra note 32. See Sher-
wood v. Sherwood, 45 Wis. 357 (1878); Matter of Smith, 254 N.Y. 283, 172 N.E.
499, 72 A.L.R. 867 (1930) (mistake as to extent of revocation clause); cf. Ma-
honey v. Grainger, 283 Mass. 189, 186 N.E. 86 (1933), 19 Corm. L. Q. 154
(1933) (mistake as to legal meaning).
Burger v. Hill, I Bradf. 360 (N.Y. 1850), and see Hill v. Burger, 10 How.
Prac. 264 (N.Y. 1854); see Will of Nadal, 2 Hawaii 400 (1861).
'In re Swartz's Will, 79 Misc. 388, 139 N.Y. Supp. 1105 (1913); cf. In re
Graber's Will, 5 N.Y. Supp. 197 (1889).
" Morrell v. Morrell, L.R. 7 P.D. 68 (1882); cf. Goods of Duane, 2 Sw. & Tr.
590, 164 Eng. Rep. 1127 (1862).
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In the United States this result can only be reached upon con-
struction and in a much more limited sphere.
Missing Parts of Lost Will
In a majority of states the testator may revoke a part of his
will by mutilation of the part with revocatory intent.38 Here it is
clear that the remainder of the will may be admitted to probate
if there was no intent to revoke the entire instrument, since the
original will minus the revoked portions constitutes the will at
the time of the testator's death. 9 In other states this manner of
partial revocation is not permitted. 40 Hence if the provision in-
tended to be revoked is discernable on the face of the instru-
ment,41 or proof of its contents can be supplied 42 the will as
originally executed should be admitted to probate. If parts are
missing and their contents cannot be proved the problem of partial
probate is presented if the jurisdiction does not allow partial re-
vocation. The same is true in any jurisdiction when a portion of
the will is missing for some other reason than that involving re-
vocatory intent,43 and perhaps also in the cases where it cannot
be ascertained whether modifications or interlineations were made
before or after execution.44
A line of New York cases holds that the remaining parts of the
will should be probated when the testator intended to revoke
'Matter of Mills, 195 Misc. 104, 89 N.Y.S. 2d 201 (1949) (and/or). One
of the most striking American cases is Matter of Smith, 254 N.Y. 283, 172 N.E.
490, 72 A.L.R. 867 (1930); and see generally Evans, Irregularities of Testamentary
Expression, 27 Ky. L.J. 241 (1939).
"See Birdwell, Statute Law of Wills, 14 IowA L. REv. 1, 290 (1929).
'Meredith v. Meredith, 5 W. W. Harr. (Del.) 35, 157 Ati. 202 (1931); In
re Fox's Estate, 192 Mich. 699, 159 N.W. 332 (1916); In re Sheaffer's Estate, 240
Pa. 83, 87 At. 577 (1913); In re Appleton's Estate, 163 Wash. 632, 2 P. 2d 71
(1931).
" Board of National Missions, etc. v. Sherry, 372 Ill. 272, 23 N.E. 2d 730
(1939); Lovell v. Quitman, 88 N.Y. 377 (1882) (a close reading of the statute
is necessary to ascertain that it does not authorize partial revocation by act).
" Lovell v. Quitman, 88 N.Y. 377 (1882); see Board of National Missions, etc.
v. Sherry, 372 Ill. 272, 23 N.E. 2d 730 (1939).
"Hartz v. Sobel, 136 Ga. 565, 71 S.E. 995 (1911); In re Callahan's estate,
403 II. 436, 86 N.E. 2d 250 (1949).
"See Cutler v. Cutler, 130 N.C. 1, 40 S.E. 689, 57 L.R.A. 209 (1902)
(partial destruction by vermin).
" Matter of Hamlin's Will, 124 Misc. 847, 208 N.Y. Supp. 799 (1925) (entire
will rejected); In re Ayres' Estate, 141 Misc. 236, 252 N.Y. Supp. 482 (1931)
(two small affected items omitted from probate); see In re Rockett's Estate, 348
Pa. 445, 85 A. 2d 303 (1944).
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only the missing parts.4 5 The result is reached without much con-
sideration as to the effect that the missing parts might have had
on the remainder.4 Likewise there is little concern over the fact
that the outcome is to allow partial revocation which in theory
is forbidden. Cases in other jurisdictions reject the entire will
upon the ground that the part offered is not the will as executed
by the testator,47 although one of them is concerned with the ex-
tent to which the missing parts might have affected the re-
mainder.48
Lost Will Partially Proved
When the will is missing at the testator's death the proponents
are usually confronted with a presumption of revocation if the
instrument had been in his possession.49 If the circumstances are
such as do not give rise to the presumption, or if it is overcome,
there are obstacles in some jurisdictions by way of statutes for-
bidding probate unless the will was destroyed after testator's
death or was fraudulently destroyed in his lifetime.50 Finally the
proponent must supply the quantum of admissible proof neces-
sary to establish a lost will, usually described as "clear and con-
vincing" or by words of similar import." If the proponent clears
" In re Kent's Will, 169 App. Div. 388, 155 N.Y. Supp. 894 (1915), see supra
text at note 2; In re Fox's Will, 118 Misc. 352, 193 N.Y. Supp. 232 (1922); In re
Bescher's Estate, 132 Misc. 625, 229 N.Y. Supp., 821 (1928); In re Enright's Will,
139 Misc. 192, 248 N.Y. Supp. 707 (1931) (construction); In re Lyon's Will, 75
N.Y.S. 2d 237 (1947); In re Ross' Will, 107 N.Y.S. 2d 185 (1951); In re O'Reilly's
Will, 109 N.Y.S. 2d 437 (1951).
" See cases supra note 45; also In re Schell's Will, 272 App. Div. 210, 70
N.Y.S. 2d 441 as discussed in 1950-1951 Survey of N.Y. Law in 26 N.Y.U.L. REv.
960-964 (1951). But see In re Curtis' Will, 135 App. Div. 745, 119 N.Y. Supp.
1004 (1909); In re Daniel's Estate, 147 Misc. 541, 265 N.Y. Supp. 663 (1983)
(entire will rejected); see also supra note 44.
"' Henry v. Fraser, 58 App. D.C. 260, 29 F. 2d 633, 62 A.L.R. 1364 (1928);
In re Ainscow's Purported Will, 41 Del. (2 Ter.) 148, 17 A. 2d 227 (1940); In
re Ainscow's Will, 42 Del. (3 Ter.) 3, 27 A. 2d 363 (1942); In re Johannes'
Estate, 170 Kan. 407, 227 P. 2d 148, 24 A.L.R. 2d 507 (1951).
" In re Johannes' Estate, supra note 47, see also text at note 4 supra.
"See White v. Brennan, 307 Ky. 776, 212 S.W. 2d 299, 3 A.L.R. 2d 943
(1948).
'See In re Arbuckle's Estate, 98 Cal. App. 2d 562, 220 P. 2d 950, 23 A.L.R.
2d 372 (1950); Estate of Havel, 156 Minn. 253, 194 N.W. 633, 34 A.L.R. 1300
(1923); In re Kerckhof's Estate, 13 Wash. 2d 469, 125 P. 2d 284 (1942); notes,
39 CAL. L. REv. 156 (1951); 32 CA. L. REv. 221 (1944); 41 MIcir. L. REv. 358
(1942).
' See annotation, 148 A.L.R. 400 (1944). The most important problem of
manner of proof is well discussed in Sparks, Admissibility of Oral Declarations of a
Testator to Prove a Lost Will in Kentucky, 36 Ky. L. J. 431 (1948).
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all of these hurdles and establishes all of the contents of the will,
it is entitled to probate.
What if it is possible to establish the contents in part only?
Unlike the topic discussed immediately above this question can
readily occur in any jurisdiction. The problems are substantially
the same. The only difference is a practical one; in the partial
revocation cases the court has part of the will before it in its
original form and is therefore more sure of its ground than in the
lost will cases where all of the evidence is secondary.
52
A number of cases have probated portions of a lost will when
the remainder could not be proved.53 However, two strong Ameri-
can decisions have rejected the entire will.5 4 They were motivated
by fears that, under the circumstances, probate of part would de-
feat testator's intent rather than carry it partially into effect. If
these opinions are considered in connection with the limitations
indicated in the decisions allowing probate of part of a lost will,5
and with the doubts expressed by the House of Lords 6 concern-
ing the probate of the residuary clause when the remainder is not
proved, the weight of judicial reasoning is clearly opposed to the
admission of a part of a lost will on a mere mechanical basis.
Writing generally upon the subject of lost wills, Dean Alvin
E. Evans considered briefly the subject of partial probate. 7 In
connection with the situation where the residuary clause alone is
proved he said:
t See text at note 68 infra.
t Sugden v. Lord St. Leonards, L.R. 1 P.D. 154 (1876) (residue and most
other provisions established-see note 56 infra); Skeggs v. Horton, 82 Ala. 352,
2 So. 110 (1886) (name of legatee of $500 not shown-does not decide whether
this passes into the residue); In re Patterson's Estate, 155 Cal. 626, 102 Pac. 941
(1909) (any substantial part, complete in itself, may be shown); Jones v. Cosler,
139 1d. 882, 38 N.E. 812 (1894) (destroyer cannot object to probate of part
proved); Steele v. Price, 44 Ky. (5 B. Mon.) 58 (1944) (principal devisees
shown though some minor ones are not); Preston v. Preston, 149 Md. 498, 132
At. 55 (1926) (allowed although some small items not proved); Tarbell v.
Forbes, 177 Mass. 238, 58 N.E. 873 (1900) (same); Jackson v. Jackson, 4 Mo.
211 (1835); Dickey v. Malechi, 6 Mo. 177 (1839). See also Creek v. Laski, 248
Mich. 425, 227 N.W. 817, 65 A.L.R. 1118 (1929) (tort action by a single legatee
for spoliation of will).
rButler v. Butler, 5 Har. (Del.) 178 (1849); Davis v. Sigoumey, 8 Metc.
(Mass.) 487 (1844); see Brackenridge v. Roberts, 114 Tex. 418, 270 S.W. 1001
(1925), and infra note 56.
See Skeggs v. Horton, Jones v. Cosler, Steele v. Price, Preston v. Preston,
Tarbell v. Forbes, supra note 53.
OWoodward v. Goulstone, L.R. 11 App. Cas. 469 (1886) (residue only
shown).
'Evans, The Probate of Lost Wills, 24 NEB. L. Rm,. 283, 289-290 (1945).
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If it [the residuary clause] throws a large estate into
the hands of non-heirs, the result seems undesirable ...
But since there is no way to know what the testator would
desire in the situation, it seems better to let the property
pass under the statute of descent and distribution.... The
better rule, then, would be to hold that the testator died in-
testate under the circumstances, unless enough is known to
indicate that this consequence would not be fantastic.
The residuary clause is flexible enough so as to catch disposi-
tions which fail because of partial revocation, 8 ademption, 9
lapse,0° or renunciation." In these cases the testator's actual de-
sire that the residue be swelled is often no more apparent than
when the partial failure of his will is due to testamentary' in-
capacity, undue influence, fraud or mistake. Is there any reason
why the gifts failing for the first group of reasons should go into
the residue while those ineffective for the second set of causes
pass under the intestate laws? True, in case of the latter the gift
is bad ab initio, but the same is true of the void bequest which
is treated like one which lapsed.62 True again, objections in the
latter group are raised at probate, but partial revocation is also
adjudicated at that stage.
When there is loss of evidence of a non-residual gift it is not
ordinarily 3 possible to declare that the lost disposition should
pass as intestate property and to sustain the will otherwise, in-
cluding the residuary clause. Here the only alternatives are to
' Bigelow v. Gillott, 123 Mass. 102 (1877); Brown v. Brown. 91 S.C. 101,
74 S.E. 135 (1911); but see Miles' Appeal, 68 Conn. 287, 36 Adt. 89 (1896).
However, the striking of words cannot have the effect of inserting a new bene-
ficiary. Esebbock v. Collins, 61 Md. 478 (1883); Nelen v. Nelen, 52 R.I. 354,
161 At. 121 (1932). Nor may the striking increase a nonresidual gift. Pringle v.
M'Pherson, 2 Brev. (S.C.) 279 (1809); cf. Larkins v. Larkins, 8 Bos. & P. 16, 127
Eng. Rep. 10 (1802).
' First National Bank of Boston v. Perkins Institute for the Blind, 275 Mass.
498, 176 N.E. 582 (1931).
'In re Boyle's Estate, 121 Colo. 599, 221 P. 2d 857 (1950), s.c., 128 Colo.
448, 281 P. 2d 465 (1951). See also Bridgeport Trust Co. v. Parker, 97 Conn.
245, 116 Adt. 182 (1922) (void legacy, but void devise passes to heirs).
' t Albany Hospital v. Albany Guardian Society, 214 N.Y. 435, 108 N.E. 812
(1915).
See note 60 supra.
In Skeggs v. Horton, 82 Ala. 352, 2 So. 110 (1886) the contents of a lost
will were established except that the name of the iecipient of a $500 legacy was
unknown. The court admitted the remainder of the will but declined to pass
upon the question of whether this passed into the residue or became intestate
property, although the court rather indicated preference for the latter result since
the testator did not intend the residuary legatee to have this money. But cannot
the same be said in case of lapse?
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permit everything not otherwise established to pass under the
residuary clause, or to reject the will altogether. While it has
never been seriously contended that the entire will fails because
of ademption, lapse or renunciation of part, we know that probate
is sometimes denied in toto because objections which are raised
at the probate stage go only to part of the will. If it were a new
proposition we could argue for uniform treatment in all cases
where there must be either partial or total failure of the will.
It is too late to make this contention, but it is not too late to
assert that there need not be total rejection of the lost will in
every case where it is possible to probate part of it.
Conclusion
It seems unsound to deny partial probate upon the ground
that part of the instrument is not "the will" of the testator. This
is just a way of saying that he cannot be allowed half-or nine-
tenths-of a loaf if the law cannot give him the whole. "Will or
no will" should refer to the finality of the adjudication, rather
than to the intended extent of the testamentary disposition.
Statutory language describing the issue involved in will contests0 4
need not be construed to require a finding of "the will, the whole
will and nothing but the will."
However, as many of the cases indicate, there must be limita-
tions to allowance of partial probate. These have been described
in various ways-that the probated part must be separable from
that which is not probated, that partial probate should not work
injustice upon the objects of the testator's bounty, nor disrupt his
scheme of distribution. Usually these boil down to a considera-
tion of whether the testator would probably have preferred
partial probate to total intestacy. This seems to be what Dean
Evans had in mind in considering the narrower problem of pro-
bate of the residuary clause of a lost will otherwise unproved.
This approach seems appropriate to the whole problem of partial
probate.
The suggested technique, that of determining whether or not
the testator would probably have preferred total intestacy or
partial probate, is essentially one employed in will construction
cases, particularly where the testator did not actually contemplate
" See note 27 supra.
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the situation which existed at his death so that resort must be
made to the rules of construction.65 It is likewise the test which
the court should employ in deciding whether to apply or reject
the doctrine of dependent relative revocation. 6 In cases where
the will partly fails on account of incapacity, undue influence,
fraud or mistake the entire contents of the will is known so that
in the light of the circumstances surrounding the testator the
court can usually form an intelligent conclusion as to whether
the testator would have preferred partial probate to total in-
testacy. As a practical matter the same is true if a will partially
fails because of insufficient execution, although here there is per-
haps a bit of a question as to whether the terms and extent of the
ineffective gift are known from a permissible source. Even if it
is considered that the ineffective gift is not demonstrated from
the instrument as a will, there is at least a declaration of inten-
tion17 with a very considerable cogency, and one which can
scarcely be disregarded by the judicial mind.
The case for partial probate is not as strong when part of the
will fails for lack of evidence. Pertinent data are missing which
are present in the situations discussed immediately above. Still
the appearance of the part produced often gives a clue as to what,
in a general way, was in the missing part. Even when the entire
will is lost, the contents which are proved, together with evidence
of the testator's surrounding circumstances, may enable the court
to find that the testator would have preferred partial probate.
Again, evidence of what the missing parts contained, although
insufficient for their inclusion in the probated instrument or even
inadmissible for that purpose, 8 may be considered upon the
'See AnTmNsoN ON WILLS, sec. 146 (1953).
See Warren, Dependent Relative Revocation, 33 HARv. L. REv. 337, 845
(1920). Surrogate Foley criticized the procedure of having such matters turn
upon speculation as to what the testator would have intended. Matter of McCaf-
frey, 174 Misc. 162, 20 N.Y.S. 2d 178 (1940). But this inquiry is made every
day in the process of construction of wills.
The doctrine of dependent relative revocation has been applied in case the
contents of the lost revoking will cannot be established. Estate of Thompson, 185
Cal. 763, 198 Pac. 795 (1921); cf. Bell v. Timmins, 190 Va. 648, 58 S.E. 2d 55
(1950); but see In re Cunningham, 38 Minn. 169, 36 N.W. 269 (1888).
'In Shattuck v. Fagan, 337 Mich. 83, 59 N.W. 2d 96 (1953) the court
went to the extent of referring to a prior will entirely invalid for want of execu-
tion, for the purpose of measuring the extent of the disposition in the probated
will. This seems unsound. See 29 N.Y.U.L. R-v. 883-885 (1954).
' See text following note 2 supra.
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issue of whether the testator would have desired partial probate
rather than total failure of the will.
The burden should be upon the proponent to establish his
case for partial probate, and naturally he will be more apt to fail
where whole or part of the will is missing. Even in that case,
however, it should be enough to show reasonable probabilities
as to whether the testator would have preferred probate of the
part that can be established to total intestacy. Probably no more
of a showing should be necessary than in making out intent in
the will construction cases.
